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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Paul Lawrence Rogers, Jr., appeals from his dismissal from the drug-court
program and subsequent imposition and execution of sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the facts and procedure as follows:
On February 24, 2003, Rogers was charged with possession of
methamphetamine and driving without privileges. Rogers reached
a plea agreement with the State, wherein the State agreed to drop
the charge of driving without privileges and charges for burglary
and attempted grand theft in an unrelated case, in return for Rogers
pleading guilty to the possession charge. The State additionally
agreed to dismiss the case altogether if Rogers successfully
completed the Ada County Drug Court Program (ACDCP).
Pursuant to the plea agreement Rogers pleaded guilty to
possession of methamphetamine and entered into a Phase I
contract for drug court on February 11, 2004. The district court
judge, the Honorable Michael McLaughlin, then transferred
jurisdiction over Rogers to the drug court.
During Rogers's participation in ACDCP he violated various rules
and was sanctioned twice. After these initial violations of the drug
court program's rules Rogers seemed to improve markedly and
even earned praise of his performance from the drug court judge on
May 12, 2004, and May 26, 2004. However, on June 30, 2004, the
drug court judge, the Honorable Ronald Wilper, confronted Rogers
with information suggesting Rogers had been attempting to solicit
fellow drug court participants to enter into a prostitution or "adult
entertainment business."
At a hearing on July 14, 2004, Judge Wilper terminated Rogers
from the drug court program.
State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739-40, 170 P.3d 881, 882-83 (2007) (footnote
omitted). The Court reversed Rogers' judgment, concluding that he had not been
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provided due process in his termination from the drug court program.

kl at 740-

43, 170 P.3d at 883-86.
On remand, Rogers was provided an evidentiary hearing on the state's
allegations of violating drug court requirements.

(Tr., pp. 33-184; "Motion for

Discharge from Drug Court" (Augmentation).) After taking evidence, the district
court found that Rogers had violated drug court requirements by:
1.

Failing to attend the orientation on February 23, 2004;

2.

Failing to provide a urinalysis test (hereinafter "UA") on
February 23, 2004;

3.

Using a controlled substance on or about February 24, 2004;

4.

Using a controlled substance on or about February 25, 2004;

5.

Using a controlled substance on or about March 29, 2004;

6.

Presenting an adulterated urine sample for testing on March
29, 2004;

7.

Failing to attend group counseling on March 29, 2004;

8.

Failing to attend group counseling on March 30, 2004;

9.

Failing to attend group counseling on March 31, 2004;

10.

Using Methamphetamine on or about April 1, 2004;

11.

Failing to report for a UA on April 3, 2004;

12.

Failing to report for a UA on April 4, 2004;

13.

Failing to report for a UA on April 5, 2004;

14.

Failing to contact his mentor;

15.

Soliciting other drug court members to work for him in an
adult entertainment business;
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16.

Failing to inform a doctor that he was a drug addict when he
obtained medication; and

17.

Failing to pay his program fees.

(Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L. 11; see also Tr., p. 37, L. 24 - p. 38, L. 8 (setting
forth "allegation number 17," related to obtaining medication from a doctor, as
later referenced by the district court in its ruling).)

The court then entered

judgment, sentenced Rogers to five years with one year determinate, suspended
the sentence, and placed Rogers on probation expiring October 1, 2009. (R., pp.
30-34.) Rogers filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 38-40.)
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ISSUES
Rogers states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Is there sufficient evidence to support the district court's
finding that Mr. Rogers violated the drug court rules by "soliciting
drug court participants to work in an adult entertainment business?"
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it terminated
Mr. Rogers' participation in drug court?
(Appellant's brief, p. 17.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
In making his claim that the court lacked sufficient evidence for its finding
that Rogers violated drug court rules when he solicited other drug court
participants to work at his adult entertainment business, Rogers relies upon
evidence never presented to the district court and ignores the evidence actually
presented. Should this Court decline to accept new evidence and further decline
to weigh that evidence against the evidence presented to the district court?
2.
The district court found seventeen violations of the drug court program.
Has Rogers failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in
terminating him from the drug court program?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Rogers' Claim Of Insufficient Evidence To Support The Finding That Rogers
Violated Rules By Recruiting Fellow Drug Court Participants To Work For His
"Adult Entertainment" Business Is Without Merit
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Rogers solicited drug court participants to

work in an adult entertainment business called "Desires, Inc.," which was a
violation of the drug court rules. (Tr., p. 180, L. 20 - p. 181, L. 18.) On appeal
Rogers asserts, relying on evidence never presented to the district court, that
there was no prohibition against him soliciting other drug court participants to
work for him in the adult entertainment business he wanted to start. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 19-20.) Rogers' argument is without merit because it requests this
Court on appeal to accept new evidence and to ultimately deem the new
evidence more credible than the evidence actually presented to the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and

conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-277, 971 P.2d 727,
729-730 (1998).

"Thus, a factual finding that a probation violation has been

proven will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the finding." State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 686, 889 P.2d 118,
120 (Ct. App. 1995).
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C.

The Factual Findings Of The District Court Are Supported By Substantial
Evidence In The Record
The district court found that Rogers had violated "Condition No. 13," which

proscribed drug court participants from being employed by other drug court
participants, by offering at least one other drug court participant a job at "Desires,
Inc.," an adult entertainment company he was trying to start. (Tr., p. 180, L. 20 p. 181, L. 18.) A review of the record shows substantial evidence supporting this
finding of fact.
At the hearing the state presented the testimony of Maureen BakerBurton, the Ada County Drug Court Coordinator. (Tr., p. 47, L. 13 - p. 49, L. 1.)
As part of her duties she would participate in "staffings" with the treatment staff
and probation officers, which would sometimes also include the drug court
participants.

(Tr., p. 67, Ls. 6-22.)

At one such staffing she and others

confronted Rogers with information that he had been contacting drug court
participants and passing out business cards for a company called "Desires, Inc."
(Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 23; State's Exhibit 6.) Rogers admitted passing out
the cards and talking to others at drug court about the business. (Tr., p. 68, Ls.
14-20.) He explained that the business was to provide escorts, dancers and
strippers, but not prostitutes. (Tr., p. 68, L. 24 - p. 70, L. 11.) Ms. Baker-Burton
explained that such a business and environment was harmful to participants in
drug court, and that this was explained in both orientation and in groups. (Tr., p.
70, L. 12 - p. 72, L. 3.) She also explained that the program did not allow drug
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court participants to work together because that is harmful to the treatment. (Tr.,
p. 72, Ls. 4-21.)
Ms. Baker-Burton explained that the September 2002 drug court
handbook was in effect at the time Rogers was in the program. (Tr., p. 81, Ls. 9-

19.) She read part of that handbook in court: "'Condition Number 13: Participants
may not be employed by other drug court participants,' on page 4." (Tr., p. 84,
Ls. 13-20.)
The state also presented evidence that Rogers admitted offering fellow
drug court participant Dana Smith a "front office job" at the escort business.
(State's Exhibit 4; see also Tr., p. 104, L. 1 - p. 113, L. 22.)
Rogers testified and acknowledged that he had business cards made up
for "Desire, Inc." with the intent of starting an adult entertainment business, and
that he gave the cards to others in drug court, but claimed he did this just so they
would have his phone number. (Tr., p. 123, L. 15 - p. 128, L. 12.) He denied
ever asking anyone in drug court to be an escort, but admitted he talked to Dana
Smith about an office job. (Tr., p. 128, L. 13- p. 129, L. 7; p. 134, L. 11 - p. 135,
L. 5; see also p. 144, L. 7 - p. 146, L. 15.)

He also admitted reading the

handbook, including the part about drug court participants not being employed by
other drug court participants. (Tr., p. 131, L. 13 - p. 132, L. 4; see also, State's
Exhibit 1, p. 6 (question, "Have you received and reviewed a copy of the Drug
Court Participant Handbook?" marked "Yes").)
This evidence before the district court supports its factual findings. The
evidence shows that Rogers was trying to start an escort service, that he talked
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to more than one fellow drug court participant about the business, and, by his
own admission, offered at least one an actual job in the business.
Rogers does not dispute that the evidence allowed the district court to find
that he solicited drug court participants to work at his adult entertainment
business. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) He does claim, however, that there was no
"Condition No. 13" in the handbook. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.) In doing so,
he cites to a February 2002 version of the drug court handbook (Id.), which is
evidence never presented to the district court.
"It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider new evidence that
was never before the trial court. We are limited to review of the record made
below." State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct.
App. 1993) (and cases cited). See also State v. Aims, 80 Idaho 146, 151, 326
P.2d 998, 1000 (1958) (appellant may not create appellate record by presenting
affidavits to appellate court); State v. Rambo, 121 Idaho 1, 822 P.2d 31 (Ct. App.
1991) (appellant may not create appellate record by attaching exhibits to brief).
Rogers did not present the February 2002 handbook to the district court,
presented no evidence that this version of the handbook was even relevant to the
proceedings, and made no presentation as to why he would have been given a
version of the handbook upon his guilty plea in 2004 that had been superseded
almost a year and one-half earlier. Rogers' request that this Court accept new
evidence and find it more persuasive than the evidence presented to the district
court is flatly inappropriate.
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Rogers' argument as to why the Court should accept this new evidence
and reject the contrary evidence actually presented to the district court is
contained in a footnote to his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20, n.14.) He
argues that by taking notice of the February 2002 handbook and declining to take
notice of the September 2002 handbook the Idaho Supreme Court determined
that the February 2002 handbook was the "version of the Handbook Mr. Rogers
agreed to be bound by when he entered drug court." (Appellant's brief, p. 20, n.
14.) Therefore, he argues, it "is now law of the case" that the February 2002
handbook was the applicable handbook.

(Id.) This argument is fatally flawed in

several respects.
First, Rogers cites to no legal authority or argument to support his claim it
is "law of the case" that the February 2002 handbook was the version applicable
to him. He has therefore failed to present any "law of the case" issue on appeal.
See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking,
not just if both are lacking.")
Second, Rogers did not preserve any appellate claim of "law of the case"
by presenting that issue to the district court.

The Idaho Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered. State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992);
State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). Rogers did not
object to evidence that the September 2002 handbook controlled (Tr., p. 81, Ls.
9-19; p. 84, Ls. 13-20), and in fact presented evidence that was consistent with
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that finding (Tr., p. 131, L. 13 - p. 132, L. 4 ). Because Rogers did not raise any
· "law of the case" claim to the district court, he cannot raise this issue for the first
time on appeal.
Third, even if the claim of "law of the case" were properly before this
Court, it is without merit.
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement
becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon
subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110
Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v.
BeartoothElec. Coop., Inc., 180 Mont. 434,435,591 P.2d 196, 197
(1979)).
Taylor v. Maile,_ Idaho_, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). Thus, to be law of
the case, a pronouncement of the Supreme Court must be "state[d] in its opinion"
and must be "a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision." Rogers relies
on an order taking judicial notice, not the opinion of the Court. In addition, what
version of the handbook Rogers was provided is not a "principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision" of the prior appeal. To tl")e contrary, what edition of
the handbook applied to Rogers is clearly a finding of fact. Rogers' claim that the
Idaho Supreme Court made a finding of fact that is binding on the district court
lacks merit.
As a final attack on the district court's factual finding that Rogers was
prohibited from soliciting other drug court members to be his employees in the
adult entertainment business he was trying to start, Rogers argues that the
. September 2002 handbook "says nothing about drug court participants working
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for one another." (Appellant's brief, p. 20, n.14.) The testimony of Maureen
Baker-Burton was that the handbook contains '"Condition

Number 13:

Participants may not be employed by other drug court participants,' on page 4."
(Tr., p. 84, Ls. 13-20.) This is the only evidence on what Condition 13 said
presented to the district court. Rogers' claim of lack of evidence on this point is
without merit.
Even if this Court decided to go outside the record, it would discover that
Rogers' argument is based on a misrepresentation. The copy of the September
2002 handbook attached to the opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion in
the prior appeal, at page 4, contains the following: "13. You must be employed
or a student throughout the duration of the program. Participants may not be
employed by other drug court participants." State v. Rogers, 2006 Opinion

No. 59, Docket No. 31264, Appendix 2 (Idaho App. August 22, 2006) (emphasis
changed). Even the most cursory comparison shows that the witness accurately
quoted the relevant portion of the handbook.
The evidence in the record supports the district court's findings of fact.
Rogers' argument to the contrary depends entirely upon trying to persuade this
Court to reject the evidence presented to the district court and instead accept
and rely exclusively upon evidence never presented to the district court.
Because Rogers' argument is diametrically opposed to actual appellate review
and is inconsistent with well established rules of appellate review, his argument
should be rejected.
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11.
The Multitude Of Violations Supports The District Court's Decision To Terminate
Rogers' Participation In The Drug Court Program
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Rogers was in violation of the drug court

programming requirements in 17 different ways. (Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L.
11.)

The court ultimately concluded he was not a good candidate for

reinstatement in that program.

(Tr., p. 190, L. 6 - p. 191, L. 1.) The court,

however, ultimately reinstated the previously imposed sentence and placed
Rogers on probation until October 1, 2009. (Tr., p. 203, L. 1 - p. 207, L. 23.)
Rogers argues that, because most of the violations occurred early in the
program, the termination was an abuse of the district court's discretion.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) Review of the record, however, shows that Rogers'
compliance with the program rules was very marginal and short-lived, while his
violations are numerous.

The record supports the district court's exercise of

discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Revocation of probation is within the discretion of the district court and

may occur at any time during the probationary period if the probationer has
violated any of the terms of the probation." State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748,
838 P.2d 876, 877 (Ct. App. 1992). Absent an abuse of discretion, the district
court's decision to revoke probation will not be reversed on appeal. State v.
Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 1232 (Ct. App. 1989). On review,
the appellate court must determine whether the district court "acted within the
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boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App.
1994).
C.

The District Court Acted Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It
Concluded That Rogers' Multiple Violations Justified His Termination From
The Drug Court Program
Rogers was accepted into the drug court program and instructed to attend

orientation on February 23, 2004. He missed the orientation, instead going and
using drugs; he absconded from the program for about a week in late March and
early April, again to use drugs; in early June he obtained a prescription without
informing the doctor that he is an addict, in violation of drug court rules; the
staffing related to solicitation of drug court members to work in his adult
entertainment business was on June 25, 2004; at no point did he contact his
mentor or pay any of the costs he was required to pay, instead choosing to
spend his money on drugs. (Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L. 11; see also Tr., p. 37,
L. 24 - p. 38, L. 8 (setting forth "allegation number 17," related to obtaining
medication from a doctor, as later referenced by the district court in its ruling);
State's Exhibit 5.) It thus appears that Rogers was never in total compliance with
the requirements of the program (seeing his mentor and paying his fees). He
absconded from the program in February and again for a week in late March and
early April to use drugs. He did better in April (after he came back) and May, but
in early June he obtained a prescription without informing the doctor of his
addiction and in late June decided to start his own adult entertainment business
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and consulted with fellow drug court participants about the business and even
offered at least one a job. Thus, the most substantial period of compliance was
about seven weeks during just a little over four months while he was in the
program.
Rogers relies primarily on his argument that the district court wrongly
found a violation in relation to his attempt to start an adult entertainment business
in contending that the court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) As
shown above, the district court did not wrongly find this violation.
Rogers also argues that he had been living "cleanly" in the community for
a year prior to the district court's decision. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) He cites for
this proposition the argument of his trial counsel. (Id. (citing Tr., p. 199, Ls. 1722; p. 200, Ls. 17-19).) Even assuming counsel correctly represented a lack of
parole violations, this does not show an abuse of discretion.

Rogers' past

behavior while in the drug court program is probably a better predictor of his
future behavior in that program than his performance on parole, which most likely
did not require the same level of intervention and supervision. In addition, it is
probable that the district court considered Rogers' most recent performance on
parole as a factor that persuaded it to ultimately suspend the sentence and order
probation.
Rogers has failed to show that the court abused its discretion by declining
to reinstate Rogers in the drug court program and instead reinstating his
sentence and placing him on probation.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
terminating Rogers from the drug court program, reinstating his sentence, and
placing him on probation,

DATED this 6th day of April 2009.
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